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1 INTRODUCTION 
The increaSingly complex networks of economic, political, social and cultural 
interactions across the world, the ever-deepening global inter-dependencies 
and, above all, the intensifying inter-linkages between all economic activities 
and agencies. between different economic sectors and between all econo-
mies within one vast 'global economy'. are argued to be the ba:;;is for the 
creation of appropriate new global institutions. most notably the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). And these processes provide the rationale for the 
formulation of global agreements to regulate thac increasingly integrated 
global economy. 
However. a closer analysis of the economic, technological and political 
forces propelling what is commonly referred to as 'globalisation' is necessary 
in order to disclose: 
• the mode of creation, the character and the modus operandi of the WTO: 
as the negotiating forum, as the repository and supervisory body over the 
contractual commitments and mutual obligations between the participat-
ing signawries, and as the adjudicator of disputes between them: 
• the sources, and the purposes, of the central agreements that emerged 
from the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1994), and the 
further global agreements that have continued to be promoted by the 
stronger member states, including in their latest proposals for a full new 
round of multi-sectoral negotiations, already dubbed The Millenial Round; 
• the interests and aims, and the respective roles in the LJR negotiations, 
and in the WTO since, of the governments of the industrialised or 'devel-
oped' countries, on the one hand, and on the other hand the broad band 
of 'developing' countries which include lesser and least developed coun-
tries (LLDCs), most of the latter in Africa; 
I This usage is deliberately pm"",,,p,, here to embrace both lesser developing (such as 
Zimbabwe. or Ghana) and least countries (such as MalaWI or Mozambique). the 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
• the general and longer-term implications, and the already evident effects 
of the new 'global regime', its complex rules, regulations and contractual 
obligations, with respect to the developing economies and to diverse 
societies and communities, and national policies around the world. 
2 GLOBALISING PROCESSES, SPECIFIC AGENCIES AND 
STRATEGIES 
The creation of the WTO and its rules and regulations may, in part, indeed 
be a response to, and an expression of broad 'global' changes. However, 
viewed from the developing countries, the more specific aims and needs, the 
active agencies and strategies driving these developments were primarily 
located in economic processes within the most industrialised countries. In 
most of Europe and North America these internal processes included serious 
economic, and in some cases even socio-economic and political, instabilities 
during most of the I 970s. These problems, in turn, were not unrelated to the 
emergence of 'threatening' newly industrialised economies, especially in 
Asia, and the actual and anticipated expansion of their highly competitive 
corporations and conglomerates onto the global plane. 
The more advanced industrialised economies and their companies had, 
themselves, always relied on extensive and essential international operations 
to complement their home-based enterprises.- However, the impetus, 
particularly from the later I 970s, towards an intensified internationalisation 
of the production, trade, investment and other economic operations of the 
already 'multinational' corporations (MNCs) and banks based in the most 
highly industrialised countries was not only driven by their intrinsic and 
incessant pursuit of wider markets, further and more profitable investment 
fields and access to essential resources elsewhere in the world. All these 
traditional aims of the MNCs, supported by their governments in 'the 
national interest', were during the 1970s also located within, and com-
pounded by the resurgence and convergence of the systemiC contradictions 
within advanced capitalist economies. Recurrent structural crises arise within 
these economies from the combined effects of the vast build-up of accumu-
lated capital and declining domestic rates of profit; together with the ever-
greater development of productive capacity or 'over-production'; in conjunc-
tion with inadequate rates of increase in domestic consumption relative to 
production, or what is referred to as 'under-consumption',' or so-called 
'saturated markets' at home. The theoretical debates attribute different 
significance and relative roles, intrinsically or at specific conjunctures, to the 
different dimensions of this 'triangular' dynamic. What is generally agreed, 
however, is that the scale, persistence and effects of the repeated economic 
fluctuations and disturbances in the most industrialised countries during the 
I 970s went beyond the normal business cycles characteristic of capitalist 
economies [ Brenner 1998]. 
2 To Africans this has been clearly demonstrated in the colonial and post-colonial operations 
of European traders and investors across the continent, and the parallel neo-colonialist role 
of their governments. 
3 Particularly under the conditions of extremely high unemployment rates in many of these 










































GLOBAUSi\T10N, THE WORLD TRADE ORGAN!SATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
Whatever their precise role or relative weight, the convergence of these 
systemic tensions in the industrialised economies during the 1970s together 
with other political and social Factors within various of these 
countries - impelled industrial and Financial corporations towards an 
increasing internationalisation of their respective production, trade and 
investment operations. This was both to evade economic, social and political 
'impediments' at home. as well as to take advantage of more favourable 
opportunities abroad; and, in so doing, also use the latter to position 
themselves more effectively to deal with the former. Where the more 
proactive or innovative companies led, others were soon to follow. 
This economic and political strategy, in turn, required that the increasingly 
'global' corporations be liberated from what were argued to be unwarranted 
regulatory constraints by their home governments on their growing 
international trade and investment and burgeoning financial operations 
abroad. This strategic drive produced, and was dramatically reinforced by the 
extensive deregulation of financial markets, starting with the 'Thatcherite' 
revolution in Britain during the 1980s. followed by the 'Reaganomics' 
offensive in the USA; and accompanied by the intellectual resuscitation and 
renewed hegemony of classical free trade theories [Clairmont 1996]. 
However, the transnationalisation of production, and the international 
expansion of trade and investment also demanded the removal of condi-
tions, or what were seen to be 'constraints', on these operations in other 
economies, imposed by the governments of those countries. This, in turn, 
produced growing pressures From the now 'transnational' corporations 
(TNCs) and financial institutions during the 1980s for trade and investment 
liberalisation throughout the world. 
3 LlBERALlSATION FROM, AND FOR, GLOBALISATION 
What most defines the emerging global order is not merely that it is driven 
and characterised by vast economic growth and world-wide expansion and 
penetration. deSignated as globalisation, but that it is facilitated and 
promoted by liberalisation. The two are integrally interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing. Globalisation is the substantive process of economic 
and technological expansion looking towards the opening up and integration 
of the entire world into and under one economic system. Liberalisation 
provides the policy lubricants and produces the appropriate regulatory/legal 
frameworks and neo-liberalism of the theoretical formulations to ensure 
the smooth implementation of the process [Keet 1997]. 
Liberalisation to facilitate globalisation was (and still is) driven in most 
African and many Latin American countries by 'structural adjustment 
programmes', directly or indirectly under the auspices of the IMF and World 
Bank [Onimode 1992]. These 'adjustments' are justified theoretically in 
terms of the necessity for such countries to 'integrate themselves into the 
global economy' [World Bank 1991]. although what this amounts to in 
practice is that they open up to exporters and investors from the global 
economy. Although some of the Latin American economies provided 
considerable openings for trade and investment, many of them and even 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
nonetheless had very small markets, with very limited immediate economic 
potential. On the other hand, most of the promising newly industrialised and 
'emerging' economies, particularly in Asia, with huge markets and attractive 
immediate investment potential, were both highly protective towards foreign 
trade and very demanding in their conditions and their constraints upon 
foreign investors. This was because they had contrived to maintain their 
relative financial and economic independence, in part because they had not 
(then) come under IMP obligations and liberalisation programmes' In this 
situation. companies from the most industrialised countries frequently had 
to rely on bilateral pressures by their governments to try to force such 
economies to allow them in and/or to operate under the conditions they 
required. 
Por these and other reasons. s by the mid-1980s it had become the convic-
tion of both entrepreneurial and governmental actors in the more developed 
countries (Des) that a more universal institution, and comprehensive global 
agreements had to be created to ensure that all such countries 'open up' their 
economies. Since all countries need external trade, to one degree or another, 
and since the Asian economies were more than usually dependent upon 
'export-led' growth, international trade relations and negotiations provided 
the ideal terrain upon which to bring pressures to bear upon such govern-
ments to open up their economies, Trade Iiberalisation was both an 
important end in itself and a useful instrument to compel such countries to 
liberalise other sectors. Thus it was that the prolonged Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations (1986-1994) 
became a process of promoting not only wider and deeper trade liberalisation 
but other highly significant 'trade-related' agreements. The new agreement 
on Trade Related Investment Measures (Trims)' for example, was designed 
to ensure greater freedom for foreign investment, by constraining specific 
'trade-distorting' governmental conditions on POI (foreign direct investment). 
under threat of retaliatory trade sanctions through the newly created World 
Trade Organisation that also emerged from the Uruguay Round. 
4 SELECTIVE PROTECTIONISM AND PRO-ACTIVE INITIATIVES -
BY "DEVELOPED" COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS 
At the same time. the more industrialised countries had other proactive as 
well as protective motivations in their promotion of new global rules, and in 
their strategies within the multisectoral Uruguay Round of negotiations, The 
proactive strategies were for the promotion of their strong and emergent 
new industries and economic sectors, The protective strategies were in 
support of their economically vulnerable domestic industries or economic 
sectors. 
4 As many were to become in some views by deliberate design - in the aftermath of the 
'Asian' financial crisis in the later years of the 19905. 
5 Such as the need for rules of the game on mutual liberalisation between the most 











































GLOBALISATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
With regard to the latter, the USA, in particular, came to the Uruguay 
Round determined to deflect demands for the much-delayed opening up of 
its markets to competitive textiles and clothing exports from the developing 
countries. And the US government managed to hold off the trade Iiberalisa-
tion that it was officially committed to, and that it was demanding of others, 
by securing a further ten year extension of its effective derogation from 
GATT obligations." This was achieved through the 'backloading' of most of its 
phased tariff reductions to the later part of the transition period, in conjunc-
tion with quotas and other technical devices. This transition period was 
designed to give such domestic industries, and the US national economy, 
further time to get through major economic adjustments and technological 
transformations taking place. 
Equally energetic battles were pursued by the USA, the EU and Japan 
during the Uruguay Round in defence of their respective agricultural sectors; 
with the US demanding that the others liberalise their agricultural markets, 
and the latter resisting exposing their smaller scale (but politically influential) 
agricultural producers to large-scale and highly competitive US agri-business. 
Once again, with economic muscle, technical resources and tactical skill, the 
EU and Japan managed to hold off agricultural trade liberalisation and to 
sustain their agricultural subsidisation programmes for a further period. This 
was necessary, they argued, in order to deal with the economic, social and 
political adjustments that would be required? 
These and other offensive/defensive battles between the 'triad' so domi-
nated the UR negotiations that attention was diverted (and intentionally 
diverted?) from their other proactive and forward-looking strategies for the 
promotion and protection of significant new, and increasingly important 
industries and economic sectors. At the same time that they were defending 
their old, weaker or declining industries, the major industrial powers were 
actively intervening for the promotion of the new economicltechnological 
revolution already underway, and creating global legal frameworks and 
specific agreements to ensure their continued domination of the epochal 
process into the future. 
In this context, the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Systems (TRIPS) was one of the most significant achievements to emerge 
from the Uruguay Round for the most advanced economies and their cutting-
edge industries. While ostensibly designed to put a stop to international 
pirating of products and processes, abuses of 'labels' and other patented 
rights, the more fundamental aim and effect of TRIPS is the tighter control 
on access to and use of ground-breaking new scientific developments and 
technological innovations, particularly in information and communication 
systems and the even more propitious bio-technology sector. Under the 
threat of cross-retaliatory trade sanctions, should they fail to control misuse 
of such 'intellectual property' rights by researchers and producers within 
6 which had been sustained for almost twenty years through the repeated extension of the 
restrictive Multifibre Agreement (MFA). 
7 And it is still not clear whether they will aced to, or continue to evade, agricultural trade 
liberalisation in the postponed multilateral agricultural negotiations that are officially pro-










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
their own jurisdictions, governments throughout the world are obliged to 
collaborate in the effective and extensive monopolisation of scientific 
knowledge and technological capacities within the already most advanced 
economies and their increasingly oligopolistic global corporations, 
A similar proactive aim and achievement of the more industrialised coun-
tries in the Uruguay Round was the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), Through the widening of the definition of traded products to include 
services, participants in the multi sectoral negotiations and cross-sectoral 
trade-offs that characterise the WTO are now also having to open up their 
hitherto preserved national service sectors. In order, for example, to obtain 
'concessions' in areas of immediate export interest to their economies, 
governments are under pressure to allow fuller and freer entry into their 
countries of giant global service companies in banking and insurance, 
transport and communications, information, advertising and entertainment, 
These, and a host of other service industries, together, now constitute a 
major proportion of the GNPs of the most developed countries, and reqUire 
a commensurate and rapid expansion of their global role as welL 
The developing countries are, not unexpectedly, lagging far behind in the 
competitive development of commercialised national service industries. 
However, from the point of view of such countries, these technical and social 
service sectors, such as telecommunications, public broadcasting and 
television, culture and sports, education and health care are not merely 
commercial enterprises but essential components of national economic and 
social development strategies. and national identities, These service 
industries will, henceforth, face ever-growing demands and elaborate 
theoretical rationalisations - for their privatisation and acceSSibility (Q foreign 
acquisition, and/or competition from powerful global service corporations in 
all these spheres. This carries significant social, cultural and political, as well 
as economic, implications. 
5 POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS AND IMBALANCED OUTCOMES -
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
It was not until the later phases of the prolonged Uruguay Round, and rather 
more so in the years that followed; that the full implications and the strategiC 
purposes of the central WTO agreements gradually became evident to the 
developing countries that participated in the UR process. In this they were 
assisted by the revelations and analyses of close observers IRagavan 1990] 
and direct participants in the process [Shahin 1996; Das 1998] on behalf of 
the developing countries.' In fact. for much of the Uruguay Round, most of 
the developing country representatives were little more than spectators of 
the 'multilateral', but often bilateral, bargaining and the agreements being 
constructed by the most powerful developed countries." 
8 The former a negOtiator in the WTO on behalf of Egypt. and the latter on behalf of India 
during the UR, 
9 Very often in the controversial Green Room negOtiaflons between the most powerful players 










































GLOBALISATION. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
In part, the weak participation and influence of the developing countries 
in the Uruguay Round was due to their lesser numbers,'o but more so owing 
to their limited experience in multilateral negotiations, although with some 
exceptions, such as India. It was also attributable to their, understandable, 
failure to foresee the new strategic vision and thrust of the highly industrial-
ised countries, and the new purposes to which their governments were 
aiming to turn the old GATT and the new WTO. However, the developing 
countries also erred in approaching the UR negotiations with very limited 
objectives and in making very narrowly focused interventions in the discus-
sions, if any at aiL 
With hindsight, the developing countries appear overly-reliant and too 
trustful in their expectations of the new round of negotiations. The develop-
ing countries. or those that had clearly identified aims, perceived the multilat-
eral, multi-sectoral liberalisation negotiations of the UR as an important 
opportunity to promote their specific interests and obtain positive responses 
to their long-standing in the existing international trade regime. 
Their first aim was to end the exclusions and secure full access for their few 
globally competitive manufactured exports which are mainly textiles and 
clothing, into the industrialised consumer markets of the rich developed 
countries. The second concern was that their other important exports, from 
the agricultural sector which are above average should be incorporated into 
GATT, which had hitherto only covered manufactured goods of interest to the 
more industrialised countries. In neither of these did the developing countries 
achieve their aims, except as longer terms prospects into the new millennium. 
The third motivation of many developing countries in going along with the 
highly unsatisfactory nature of the UR negotiations, and in welcoming the 
establishment of the WTO at the end, was their optimistic expectation about 
the new 'multilateral rules-based system' for international trade and other 
economic relations that would be set in motion through the WTO. It was 
anticipated that this would, inter alia, bring to an end the unilateral measures 
and pressures, largely by the strongest governments against weaker, 
although also between the Des themselves, that had characterised interna-
tional economic relations. Within the new multilateral framework of rules 
and regulations, all members would be able, and would be expected, to settle 
their trade and trade-related disagreements through the Dispute Resolution 
Undertaking (DSU) that emerged from the UR. 
6 USES, AND ABUSES, OF THE "MULTILATERAL RULES-BASED 
SYSTEM" - BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The experience with the functioning of the DSU over the five years since the 
creation of the WTO, has not been as positive as expected. The complexity 
of the issues and the procedures, and the capacity of stronger coun-
tries/companies to prolong the dispute panel processes," means that weaker 
I 0 Although. with the rapid accession of countnes to GATT during the UR. their 
numbers anually surpassed that of the OECD mpmhpc" when the WTO came to be officially 
launched in 1995. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY&' DEVELOPMENT 
complainants can be irreparably damaged in the interim, even iF the eventual 
WTO panel ruling is in their favour. Weaker countries are also manifestly 
reluctant to pursue ofFicial DS processes through the WTO due to their lack 
of legal expertise and the vast costs entailed in hiring international legal 
experts and researchers, At an under-lying level, this caution is very probably 
also due to their apprehension (arising from wider experience) about possible 
indirect reprisals by their stronger adversaries, in other spheres and ways, 
should they institute formal proceedings against them. 
These, of course, have long been the type of dilemmas facing weaker 
parties in processes within national judicial systems all over the world. 
But the range of precautionary procedures, compensatory provisions and 
corrective measures, such as legal aid, that have evolved in many national 
judicial systems to respond to such difficulties and inequities have not yet 
been incorporated into the WTO adjudication processes. Some of the 
procedural problems are gradually being addressed within the WTO, such as 
the professionalisation of the panels, and the determination of time-frames 
within which disputes must be resolved rEU 1998]. There is also a proposal 
for a dedicated law centre, financed by the richer countries, to advise and 
assist weaker developing countries in the WTO. 
However, the bias against the weaker countries in the new, formally 
impartial, WTO OSU is fundamentally more evident in the very different 
implications of the theoretical right of aggrieved parties to impose WTO-
approved sanctions on transgressors. The formalistic nature of the 'equal 
rights and treatment' of all members within the WTO is manifest in the 
limited utility, or indeed the very feasibility, of such authorised counter-
actions being imposed by weak governments against strong governments. 
The impact of such putative measures upon the strongest economies would 
invariably be limited, but the economic and political risks would be consider-
able to the weaker implementers of such 'sanctions'. This disability is 
reinforced by the fact that OS processes in the WTO are designed to deal 
with disputes between the contracting parries as purely bilateral matters. 
Apart from hypothetical collective 'moral pressures', for what they are worth 
in the sphere of ruthless international trade relations, the system does not 
have a multilateral mechanism of effective enforcement [Oas 1998b]. The 
observance and efficacy of panel findings is, in the final analysis, largely 
related to economic power and political influence, or in rare instances 
calculated decisions about the long-term advantages to upholding the wider 
multilateral rules-based system.: 3 
The more general threat (0 the so-called 'multilateral' rules-based system 
is that some powerful governments, mainly, but not only the USA, continue 
to act unilaterally when it is considered necessary (0 protect or promote 
12 Although many developing countries are not satisfied that this centre, largely due to the 
interventions of the European Commissioner Leon Brittain. will now not be an independent 
and separately financed entity located in Geneva but outside of the WTO - as originally 
proposed by Norway and some other governments somewhat more sensitive to the disad-
vantages of the weaker countries, 











































GLOBALISATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
national economic and even political interests. Washington routinely applies 
its own 301 trade legislation to block or threaten other countries, and even 
resorts to extra-territorial enforcement of particular national economic laws 
to serve US objectives." The US government is also noted for its 
frequent recourse to damaging anti-dumping actions and countervailing 
measures against foreign imports when required to do so by domestic 
industries to protect them against allegedly 'unfair' competitors. This may be 
within ,he letter of the relevant WTO agreements, but goes against the spirit 
of the open, free trade, competitive global economy purportedly being 
promo:ed by the new world trade regime. On the other hand, it is extremely 
difficult for weaker countries lacking the necessary financial, legal, trade 
monitoring and industrial research facilities to institute their own anti-
dumping actions powerful economies such as the US and the EU, 
even where they possibly have a strong case.' 
The US is not the only country to flout the letter and spirit of the new 
'global multilateralism'. The more industrialised countries grouped together 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
attempted, through their own less-than-global multilateral negotiations, to 
create a new Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), outside of the 
WTO, for the full and unfettered operation of foreign investors and TNCs 
throughout the world [European Commission 1995]. This strategy was 
effectively exposed and energetically opposed by a global alliance of civil 
society organisations which succeeded in dividing the OECD governments, 
causing the French government to officially withdraw its support and the 
process was suspended. Had this not happened, the MAl would have been 
presented, in form multilaterally but in essence unilaterally, to all the other 
countries seeking foreign investment [Abugre 1998]. The EU, Japan and 
other governments, under continuing pressure from their global financial 
corporations and TNCs, are now aiming to get their (renamed) Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MIA) integrated into and approved within the 'more 
fully ;i1ultilateral' and 'bottom up' processes of the WTO. However rhis, in 
turn, raises further critical questions with respect to the functioning of the 
WTO, per se. I ' 
In addition to the type of evasions illustrated above, the 'multilateral' 
nature of decision making in the WTO, itself, has been most pervaSively 
contradicted by the highly non-transparent, non-inclusive processes within 
the organisation, and the backroom deals between the most powerful 
countries which are then to the rest of the WTO membership as 
14 As in Washington's threats of sanctions against countries/companies not observing US 
economic measures against Cuba and other countries considered hostile to US interests. 
15 As has been argued with respect to the 'dumping' of EU agricultural products in developing 
countries' markets, because the Common Agricultural Programme (CAP) subsidies distort 
and probably dIsguise the real COStS of production. 
16 [here is continuing developing country govemmenr and global non-govemmental opposition 
to the negotiation of an MIA in the WTO, because it is the content and implications of such 
a 'global charter for the TNCs' that is being resisted, and not only the location of such legali-
salion; although the WTO per Sf' as the venue and instrument for such a process is also 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &- DEVELOPMENT 
a defacto 'consensus' to be endorsed [Khor 1999]. Tactical alliances between 
smaller groups of like-minded countries, or those with specific interests in 
common, may be an intrinsic part of multilateral negotiations but, in the case 
of the WTO, the influence of specific groups of the more influential countries 
is reinforced by the marked susceptibility, and even the unofficial 'account-
ability', of the WTO Director-General and the Secretariat to the most powerful 
member states. IT However, quite apart from this manifestation of global 
power politics, the more fundamental, structural bias of the WTO resides in 
the WTO Secretariat's 'impartial' application of the tendentious agreements 
already secured by those states, and the official, unproblematised endorse-
ment and promotion by the WTO of the theories and assumptions of the 
global neo-Iiberal paradigm [WTO 1996]. 
The WTO Secretariat's accommodation to the most powerful states, is also 
evident in the prolonged failure of the organisation in the first five years of 
its existence to energetically pursue and secure the effective implementation 
of the formal undertakings made, and the assurances given to the lesser and 
least developed countries by the industrialised country governments in the 
Final Act of the Uruguay Round in Marrakech. The "Marrakech Ministerial 
Decision on Measures in Favour of Least Developed Countries", and 
"Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effect of the Agricultural Reform 
Programme on Net Food Importing Countries" were the belated acknowl-
edgement by the main beneficiaries of the UR, of the marginalisation of the 
weaker countries and the predicted (or what they defined as the 'possible') 
prejudicial effects of the new global trade regime would have on them. 
7 MARGINALISATION AND/OR "MORE FAVOURABLE 
TREATMENT" - ESPECIALLY FOR LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
Most of the lesser developed countries, and the majority of the UN's officially 
designated 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) world-wide, are in Africa. 
These countries had an extremely weak presence throughout the Uruguay 
Round and their interests and particular needs were Virtually ignored until the 
penultimate phases, when UNCTAD and other UN agencies stepped in to assist 
them. The preliminary assessment of UN agencies, subsequently endorsed in 
general terms by WB and OEeD studies, was that, although the UR would 
indeed encourage a massive expansion in global trade, this would be very 
unevenly distributed according to the production and trade capacities of the 
respective countries. Weaker countries, above all in Africa, would actually lose 
out from global trade liberalisation, in absolute as well as relative terms.: 8 
17 As with directors of the Bretwn woods Institutions, the US and the EU were absolutely 
adamant that the first Director-General of the WTO should be a man enjoying their confi-
dence and endorsement. 
18 According to such studies (OXFAM 1998), the immediate effects of the increasingly liberalised 
global trade regime would be overwhelmingly to the advantage of the most highly developed 
countries. The estimates include a combined $ j 39 billion trade expansion for the EU, USA and 
Japan. But weaker economies would suffer losses, such as $2.6 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa, 










































GLOBALISATlON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
Even before the predictions of their weakening performance in the global 
free trade system, the weak participation by the LLDCs in the Uruguay Round 
was clearly evident. This was due not only to their small numbers,'o lack of 
experience and limited technical and financial resources, but more funda-
mentally because they had little to 'offer' in the complex cross-cutting 
negotiations on reciprocal tariff reductions and other mutual concessions 
being agreed between the most highly developed countries. Some of the 
stronger developing countries in Asia and Latin America did make their own 
tariff reduction offers, as did South Africa. However, the LLDCs had little to 
'bargain with' in the multilateral UR, largely because many of them had 
already unilaterally introduced extensive external trade liberalisation under 
IMF!WB structural adjustment programmes. Furthermore, their extremely 
limited bargaining base simply reflected the low interest of the 'majors' in 
what their economies had to offer, at any rate at that stage. Conversely, most 
LLDCs at that stage (and still) had little immediate capacity, or much to gain 
as actors from the major new agreements in the UR for the liberalisation of 
investment, trade in services and so on. 21 
The intrinsically weaker bargaining power of weaker economies in interna-
tional trade negotiations, in terms of what they could reCiprocate in order to 
benefit from the trade liberalisation of other economies, had long been 
acknowledged within GATT. Thus, key articles in Part IV on Trade and 
Development (endorsed in 1966) enshrined a 'non-reciprocity clause' for 
developing and especially least developed countries. This meant that they 
could benefit from better trade access even if they did not have much to 
'offer' in return. What is more, this clause applies not only to trade but to 
other safeguard actions taken by such countries for development purposes. 
However, exemption from the reciprocity obligation was not sufficient to 
compensate for the systemic imbalances in the processes and products of 
international trade negotiations; nor for the very uneven levels of develop-
ment between the participating economies. Thus the Tokyo Round of GATT, 
in 1979, incorporated a highly significant 'enabling clause', on "Differential 
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries".22 These and other counter-balancing provisions within 
GATT towards developing countries were carried over into the WTO. They 
have come to be known as "special and differential terms" (SOTs) and 
include greater flexibility with regard to certain WTO obligations, such as the 
use of subsidies; more favourable thresholds as with anti-dumping actions; 
and longer time-frames for the implementation of WTO undertakings, such 
as with TRIPS; with the right to further extensions if duly motivated. 
19 It is interesting to note that, in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. only colonial Southem Rhodesia 
and the then Union of South Africa were members of GATT right from the outset in 1948. 
20 South Africa actually chose to make a unilateral tariff reduction offer in 1993, during the UR. 
commensurate with the status and obligations of a Developed Country; a decision and 
designation still causing controversy within this country. and posing possible future con-
straints on the domestic policy options of the SA Govemment. 
21 India being one of the few notable exceptions amongst developing countries, at that stage, 
has since been joined by Malaysia and other South East Asian countries; and. to some 
degree, South Africa 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The three broad objectives of these terms are to provide these economies 
with 
• enhanced market access and trade promotion, not only through the 
generalised system of preferences (GSP). but through preferential duty 
free terms for the LOCs if this is duly motivated; in addition to their right 
to enjoy intra-regional preferences if they are part of regional trade 
agreements (RT As); 
• discretion in the domestic use of certain policy instruments, including the 
employment of tariffs as safeguards when necessary for balance of pay-
ments (BOP) purposes or as interim protections for infant industries, or 
the use of government supports to domestic production; 
• support from the developed countries, not only in the form of technical 
and financial assistance, but in what is called "the best endeavour clause" 
to ensure that developing country interests are safeguarded when OCs 
take certain measures in their own interests. [UNCTAO 1998b J. 
However, in practice, the needs and special rights of developing countries are 
frequently simply ignored or sidelined by the onward thrust of the 'majors' 
in WTO processes. And such established rights are also under increasing 
pressures both within and without the WTO. An illustration of the latter is 
that the SOTs for developing countries enshrined in the WTO are generally 
ignored and often directly contradicted in IMF and World Bank policy 
prescriptions; for example in prohibiting governments under their sway from 
utilising certain trade policy instruments, or obliging them to remove 
subsidies on food or small-scale agricultural production on the grounds of 
narrowly conceived and rigidly applied fiscal constraints. 
Other external pressures, for example on the non-reciprocity rights of 
LLOCs, arise from the growing insistence of the EU that countries seeking 
better trade access to the EU market must enter into reciprocal free trade 
agreements with the EU. Such reciprocal FTAs are even a central component 
in the EU's proposed scenarios for it's future relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) members of the Lome Convention. Similarly, the 
inclusion by the EC in its post-Lome proposals of various trade-related 
measures, still under discussion and contention within the WTO (see page 
16), pose possible dangers to the current rights and future exemptions in 
these spheres for these countries in the WTO [Keet 1 999J. 
Within the WTO, itself, there are also growing pressures to limit the 
coverage, scope and duration of SOTs. 'More advanced' developing coun-
tries, such as Peru, Argentina and Brazil, are being urged to disinvoke certain 
S&O rights and safeguards that they can presently use. Other developing 
countries applying to join the WTO since the Uruguay Round are being 
pressurised to join on "commercially viable bases" rather than on established 
special and differential terms. There is also an insidious tendency within the 
WTO to refer to SOTs as if they apply only to LOCs in the narrowest 
definition of the term. This might have the main aim of excluding some of 
the more advanced developing countries, but it would also exclude many 










































GLOBALISATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATlON AND THE IMPUCATIONS 
rights. Above all, the US government is particularly insistent that a definitive 
time-limit. namely the year 2005, be set on all current derogations from 
WTO obligations for all member states. 
8 IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND FUTURE NEGATIVE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Some of the immediate problems of developing countries in the WTO are 
apparently merely procedural. but at bottom level technical and legal, 
economic and political. The WTO incorporates not only dozens of speCific 
agreements but thousands of pages of rules and regulations. trade and tariff 
undertakings going back fifty years to the beginning of GATT. The immediate 
difficulty facing new member countries, with limited technical and legal 
capacities. is the formal implementation of their obligations as contracting 
parties. This entails, for example. bringing various sections of their national 
legislation. such as their Intellectual Property Regimes, into conformity with 
WTO reqUirements; together with a host of other legal and institutional 
measures. 
Many developing countries and especially LDCs have not been able to 
carry out such implementation and duly notify the WTO of their compliances 
and submissions. Until formal notifications are made, such countr·ies are not 
in a position to access and implement their rights under specific agreements. 
In many cases, failure to effectively scrutinise and act on WTO agreements 
and regulations, means that governments are not even fully aware of the 
rights that they do have, and could utilise, in their domestic economies 
without fear of challenges or reprisals within the WTO. Rights in the WTO 
reside in their affirmation and active application. If they are not utilised that 
is regarded as the conscious option of such governments, if noted at all. The 
concern of other contracting parties is not with rights of others unused but 
with obligations to themselves unfulfilled; and this is what they act on. 
In addition to these implementation and realisation challenges. the even 
more serious prejudice to the developing countries in the new trade regime 
under the WTO is that the focus of the negotiations had been almost 
exclusively on products, services and other issues of prime interest to the 
more developed countries. i':ot only did the specific products of export 
interest to developing countries largely remain outside of the trade liberalisa-
tion bU[, because of their weak bargaining position, their particular exports 
actually continue to face widely prevalent tariff peaks and tariff escalations. 
that are higher than the tariffs obtaining on products mainly traded by and 
between the more developed countries. This is a persistent grievance of 
developing countries and their repeated demand on the most developed 
countries for remedial action. 
23 Which also happens. cOlncidemally. to be the year in which the effective derogation that the 
USA enjoys on textiles and clothing comes to an end. 
24 The EU has offered full duty free (although not quota-free) access to its markets for all 
products from all LDCs This was endorsed at the First WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singa-
pore. in 1996. but only as an ··autonomous". meaning non-obligatory. undertaking by the 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Further outstanding disadvantages and future dangers for developing 
countries derive, somewhat paradoxically, from the pending/possible 
liberalisation of agricultural production and trade, On the one hand, this 
could end the subsidisation and unfair trade competition from EU and other 
agricultural exporters into developing countries, Until this happens, such 
exports are placing insupportable competitive pressures on agricultural 
producers, including small-scale food producers, in developing economies, 
On the other hand, with many such Third World producers simultaneously 
being encouraged by the World Bank to switch from food production to 
commercial export crops, and with the periodic impact of droughts and other 
natural, and man-made, disasters, there is a growing tendency for many 
such countries to depend upon food imports, and even food aid, , , from the 
most highly industrialised countries! With the proposed liberalisation of 
agricultural markets, and the removal of agricultural production subsidies 
there is a distinct pOSSibility that such dependent, or 'net food importing', 
countries could be seriously affected by rising global food prices and 
diminishing food aid from the decreasing agricultural production in some of 
the most developed countries, especially in Europe. This carries serious 
financial and broader economic, social and political implications for many 
developing countries. 
Amongst their many grievances and proposals, issues relating to the 
multifunctional role and requirements of their own agricultural production 
and food security, and more fair international trade, remain a major 
preoccupation and demand of the developing countries within the WTO. 
However, even as they try to get responses on these and many other 
concerns from those that dominate the WTO, they are faced with constant 
new demands and funher pressures from the same developed countries -
most recently towards a full new multisectoral Millennial Round. 
9 NEW DEMANDS AND PRESSURES FROM DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
In the aftermath of the Uruguay Round not only have the DCs barely 
responded to the problems and proposals of the developing countries, but 
the most powerful amongst them, most notably the USA, have continued to 
vigorously pursue their own interests and push their own priorities onto the 
WTO agenda, Thus, even as the developing countries came to the first WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore (SMC), in 1996, prepared to argue their 
case for the full implementation of outstanding commitments and agree-
ments by the DCs, and for a review of the impact of the recent UR agree-
ments, a new proposal from the US for negotiations on information 
technology suddenly appeared on the SMC agenda, without any prior 
discussion in the preparator?, meetings. The most developed countries, and 
a few other 'pivotal states' ,'" withdrew into backroom negotiations, leaving 
the remainder addressing themselves, and eventually emerged towards the 
end of the conference with a 'consensus' for a new Information Technology 
25 Including Singapore. as [he host and a country with conSiderable mformation technology 
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Agreement (ITA), which others were invited to accede to in due course 
should they so decide. 
A similar attempt was made by the US to slip an entirely new agreement 
on electronic commerce into the Second WTO Ministerial Meeting in Geneva, 
in May 1998, even though it was billed as a celebratory not a negotiating 
meeting. On that occasion, however, developing country delegates were 
more alert and managed to temporarily hold off a definitive Agreement on 
Electronic Commerce. subject to further analYSis on the implications for their 
economies, and fuller discussion. It is on the basis of such experiences, in the 
context of the broader domination and tendentious utilisation of WTO 
processes by the most powerful countries, that some developing country 
governments, and many non-governmental organisations from the develop-
ing and even developed countries, are now closely monitoring attempts to 
introduce ever more 'new issues' into the WTO. 
The US government, Canada. the EU and other European countries, such 
as Norway, have repeatedly mooted the possibility of introducing into the 
WTO 'trade-related' agreements on labour and social rights, on environ-
mental protection, and even on human rights, 'good governance' and 
corruption, amongst other things. In the first place there are important 
questions to be faced as to whether multilateral trade negotiations and a 
global trade organisation are appropriate instruments to deal with what are 
very complex, multi-dimensional problems. The links to trade are not clear 
or uncontested, and the efficacy or desirability of applying trade sanctions to 
deal with such complex problems is questionable, particularly in the context 
of the highly tendentious utilisation of the WTO by the dominant powers. 
The second question relates to the (overt or covert) motivations of DCs in 
these issues. Some may be genuine in these suggestions. For other govern-
ments, however. these proposals may simply be public relations postures to 
appease organised labour and other pressure groups on these issues at 
home. In this respect there are distinct prmectionist intentions and implica-
tions of such demands. Alternatively, or Simultaneously, proposing to place 
such issues on the table may be a diversionary bargaining ploy while the real 
intention and more fundamental interest of such governments is to get mher 
subjects, of prime importance to their TNCs and financial institutions, onto 
the formal WTO negotiating agenda. This is what seems to have happened 
at the SMC'o where the EU was apparently willing to 'compromise' on the 
continued location of the proposed labour clause in the ILO. However, as an 
undeclared but indirect counter-balance, the EU was particularly active in 
promoting an investment agreement to be taken up in the WTO and, 
together with the US, in proposing other significant new 'trade-related' issues 
for negotiation. These include competition policy and government procure-
ment, the latter potentially a vast new area for lucrative business ventures for 
global corporations, larger even than merchandise trade. 
The developing countries received these proposals with marked caution, 
undoubtedly based on their with so-called 'multilateral' 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
negotiations in the WTO hitherto. However, their reservations were also 
based on the subjects themselves because investment, competition policy 
and government procurement play crucial roles in national economic and 
social development strategies [Khor 1996, 1997]. In the case of South Africa, 
for example, having to open up tendering for all government contracts 
(national. provincial, local and municipal) to international competition, with 
'non-discrimination' against foreign tenders, could prevent government from 
fulfilling its aims to promote women and SMMEs (Small, Medium and Micro 
Enterprises), and hitherto disadvantaged sections of the population, more 
generally, in the award of government contracts. This could affect diverse 
areas of national enterprise development, ranging from housing, school, road 
and dam construction, to urban renewal projects and water and sanitation 
services, to hospital pharmaceutical and equipment supplies and subcon-
tracted services such as laundering, and even the provision of school meals, 
educational and other materials, and so on. 
The developing countries at the SMC would only agree that these new 
issues be made the subject of Working Group examinations. These, they 
insisted, would have to include research and analysis on the real 'trade' 
connections, and the development implications, of such subjects, and were 
to be undertaken in conjunction with appropriate specialised agencies such 
as UNCTAD. The further clear ,condition, incorporated into the final declara-
tion that emerged from the SMC, was that such Working Groups would not 
be and should not automatically develop into negotiating groups on these 
issues. There are, however, strong indications that this is precisely what the 
EU, in particular, intended and intends. The working groups are gradually 
and insidiously being turned into de facto negotiating forums towards the 
proposed multisectoral Millennial Round; of which [he EU is also one of [he 
strongest proponents. 
Whether these issues enter the WTO, and indeed whether there is to be a 
fully new multisectoral round of negotiations is currently being debated and 
informally 'negotiated' between the permanent delegations (or those 
countries that can maintain permanent delegations) in Geneva, and will be 
formally decided or confirmed at the Third Ministerial Meeting (3MM) in 
Seattle, USA, in December 1999. The possibilities or probabilities pose 
developing countries with diverse and extremely difficult political and legal 
challenges. 
10 "MILLENNIAL" CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
THE WTO AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
In addition to the specific content and implications of the proposed 'new 
issues' for negotiation, the following are some of the key principles, the 
procedural, technical or tactical demands, and the legal, political or strategic 
challenges facing developing countries, including South Africa. 
10.1 Confirmation and application, extension and 
transformation of special and differential terms 
The first imperative is the defence of the principles underpinning SOTs and 
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countries that these terms provide. All countries that have such needs have 
to identify, apply, and where necessary argue for the extension of the 
coverage of these terms. They need also, collectively, to reject the external, 
a priori imposition of arbitrary limits and time-frames that do not arise out 
of and reflect the real economic processes, and broader social, environ-
mental, political and related dynamics within their national economies and 
emerging regions (such as SAO C) [Keet 1998]. 
There are strong indications that developing countries are beginning to 
analyse and prioritise the defence of SOTs in their strategies vis-a.-vis the 
WTO [EgyptI998; OAU 1998; India 1998]. However, rhere is also a more 
proactive strategic potential in SOTs. The implicit recognition and even 
explicit acknowledgement (GATT 1979) that it is inequitable to apply equal 
treatment to economies that are unequal has to be extended from merely 
providing a set of temporary technical/legal provisions to compensate for the 
'imbalances' in the negotiations. The imbalances are much broader and 
more fundamental. 
The neo-liberal assumption that WTO rules for an open global economy 
will create a 'level playing field' upon which all can compete on an equal 
footing, after some limited transitional concessions, is totally fallacious as 
long as companies, countries and communities have vastly different 
strengths and resources, interests and aims. The fundamental question is 
how a single set of global rules can be comprehensive, fine-tuned and flexible 
enough to ensure equity, sustainability and stability. 
The more fundamental fallacy is that there can be a single set of rules and 
a single global paradigm applying to international economic relations, and 
to regional, national or even very local economic entities; whereas countries, 
communities and peoples around the world are located at totally different 
levels of development and pursue or favour different forms and methods of 
development. This requires not merely temporary exemptions but different 
conceptions. This is a broad and complex challenge, and many arguments 
and agencies (such as the UN socio-economic organisations) have to be 
deployed in what is a fundamentally important paradigmatic debate. In this 
context, however, SOTs can also be utilised, within the WTO itself, as a 
principle and precedent from which to argue the case for distinctive and 
diverse models of development. 
10.2 Implementation of obligations, interrogations and counter-
conditionalities 
In the spirit of the above, the implementation of WTO rules within national 
jurisdictions cannot merely be a question of automatic compliance. This 
should not be a simple one-way technicaillegal process. At the very outset, 
there have to be interrogations as to whether the required compliance with 
WTO MTAs (Multilateral Trade Agreements), for example on 'national 
treatment' for global corporations, conforms to established constitutional 
principles, such as on preferences and affirmative action commitments by 
government, and other basic national social and economic aims, political 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Even in pursuing such legal analyses, developing countries face other 
problems and choices. Given the considerable deficiencies they have in 
terms of technical resources and legal capacities, compounded by the 
belated accession of most of them to GATT/WTO, developing countries 
should directly link their fulfilment of obligations to adequate technical and 
financial assistance. This has, in fact, already been officially promised 
because, without it, the system is manifestly not fully-inclusive and 'global'. 
However, such technical assistance should also be appropriate to their 
fullest needs, and not merely consist of training on the WTO by the WTO, 
amounting to little more than instructions on how to implement its rules 
and regulations." Even the belated High Level Meeting (HLM) within the 
WTO in 1998, in supposed fulfilment of these promises, has still not fully 
dealt with the broader difficulties and more fundamental needs of the 
LLDCs. 
The developing countries are also on strong moral and political grounds in 
demanding that their implementation of WTO obligations also be directly 
linked to, and even conditional upon, full implementation of the commit-
ments made to them by the governments of the most developed countries 
at Marrakech in 1994. The problem is that, at the legal level, the contractual 
obligations, on the one hand, and the compensatory DC undertakings, on the 
other, are of a different order; with the latter merely being of the 'best 
endeavour' category, which means voluntary and non-binding. There are, 
however, other fully legal and binding commitments by the most developed 
countries that simply continue to be evaded. This is partly through the use of 
a range of technical devices, but more fundamentally because the WTO 
works on the principle that an evasion or abuse only becomes such in 
practice, once it is challenged, and proven to be prejudicial to their trade 
interests and rights, by a specific country through a complaint lodged under 
the DSU. With all that that entails, most developing countries simply cannot 
pursue such grievances other than through repeated, but generally ignored, 
formal political statements and collective declarations." 
Continuing to pose the non-compliance of the most developed countries with 
their own formal undertakings, such as the US in relation to the ATC (Agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing), could however be utilised as an effective 
tactical weapon by the developing countries in another way. Insistence on 
prompt and full compliance could be an effective counteraction to covert 
attempts by some such governments to pose the implementation of their own 
existing obligations as trade-offs for other countries accepting 'new issues' for 
negotiation. This is highly questionable because the established rights (of 
developing countries) and existing obligations (of developed) must stand in 
their own right, and be implemented as such, without new conditionalities 
being imposed, or new quid pro quo concessions being required. 
27 This is precisely how the WTO and ICT are currently interpreting and implementing their 
technical assistance programmes for LLDCs. 
28 This is patricularly the pattern in Africa. with repeated. but generally futile. collective 
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10.3 Review, impact assessment and essential changes 
Implementation should, above all, be linked to, and conditional upon 
intensive and impartial reviews of problematic WTO rules and MTAs. This 
has to be undertaken with a view to establishing not only their technical 
feasibility and legal consistency or conformity, but their basic applicability to 
developing countries, to their different economic sectors with their respective 
needs and vulnerabilities, and other considerations. This, in turn, is not 
simply a question of invoking temporary S&O exceptions and exemptions, 
but of interrogating the very objectives and implications of agreements that 
most developing countries acceded to only 'after the event'. 
All agreements have to be subject to such scrutiny for their 'compliance' 
with the situations and needs of developing countries. They have to be 
closely analysed for their deficiencies and imbalances, with clear proposals 
for changes required. One such change, already being put forward by various 
developing countries, is that in the interests of domestic industrial develop-
ment, TRIMs should not bar developing countries from setting local content 
requirements upon the direct investment ventures of foreign capital in their 
countries. This is but one example in an extensive range of proposals. Much 
work has already been done on behalf of developing countries in analysis 
[Oas I 998b; UNCTAO I 998b], and capacity building especially for LLOCs in 
Africa [SEATINI-UNOP 1998. 1999]. 
Fortunately. there are also programmed opportunities within the WTO 
that can and must be used to argue for and obtain modifications and 
amendments to existing regulations and agreements. Formal provisions have 
been made for Regular Reviews of a wide array of issues, including safe-
guards, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, dispute settlements and a 
whole range of other technical issues. There are also provisions for SpeCial 
Reviews of existing agreements on subsidies, anti-dumping, services. TRIPS, 
TRIMs and others. All of these are part of what is called the Built-in Agenda, 
which is clearly very full and technically extremely complicated. In addition 
to the above reviews, the WTO agenda includes further formal negotiations 
still due on agriculture, services, rules of origin and anti-dumping. 
The main problem for developing countries in pursuing their demands 
through such reviews are, however, not only lack of adequate technical 
capacity and personnel, but the overwhelming political weight and proactive 
initiatives of the most powerful countries in determining the priorities on the 
WTO agenda. Thus, even as the developing countries struggle to cope with 
the burdensome built-in agenda, inherited from the Uruguay Round, the more 
developed countries are already promoting a full new round of ne,$otiations 
to include both existing issues and a whole range of other issues.' 
10.4 Preconditions and pre-emptive positions by developing 
countries 
Over and above the specific problems within these new issues with respect 
to their national development priorities and needs, the immediate and basic 
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problem is that developing countries are simply not prepared, meaning 
willing or able, to cope with another full multisectoral round of negotiations 
while they are still trying to get to grips with the Uruguay Round. If the 
proposed Millennial Round does go ahead, it will inevitably replicate many 
of the problematic processes and unbalanced outcomes of the UR. 
This time, however, developing countries are rather more aware of the 
nature of the WTO as a negotiating forum in which countries (and corpora-
tions) table overt proposals and engage in covert collusions to pro-
mote/defend their interests. In these complex and unrelenting battles, legal 
principles and arguments and social/economic evidence and counter-demands 
have to be marshalled. In the final analysis, however, the WTO is not an 
assembly of nations or a debating chamber, like the UN. It is a bargaining 
chamber that ultimately reflects the balance of economic and political power 
but also tactical skill. In this context, it is essential that developing 
countries form strategic alliances amongst themselves where they hold com-
mon interests vis-a.-vis the hegemonic powers, but still agree tactical trade-
offs on specific issues and interests amongst themselves where they differ. 
There is evidence that bilateral and multilateral, general. specific and 
overlapping alliances are beginning to be formed amongst developing 
countries on the possible content and form of the proposed new round. Such 
alliances will be extremely important for their strategic engagements and 
effectiveness should there be a full new round in the early years of the 
millennium. However, as with all the most effective strategies, the most 
important immediate stance for the developing countries is to adopt an 
'advanced bargaining position' from the very outset. In the current situation 
this means collectively and firmly 
• opposing any new issues being placed on the WTO agenda until a full 
review has been made on the impact and implications of existing UR and 
post-UR agreements on all developing countries, and especially LLDCs, 
with appropriate modifications as required; 
• opposing any further powers and coverage, or areas of responsibility 
being attributed to and located within the WTO, until and unless it 
changes its modus operandi and becomes a more fully inclusive, transpar-
ent, genuinely impartial and accountable organisation; 
• opposing any further full multi-sectoral round of global negotiations, 
regardless of the designation, until the current and programmed nego-
tiations have been carried through, and implemented, and their effects 
for all economies, in turn, verified. 
11 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT, MAIN CHALLENGES, AND 
SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
Whatever South Africa's formal designation in the WTO, and however it is 
positioned economically in the 'global economy', this country's strategic 
30 With the UK government now seeking to gain greater acceptance for a full new round by 
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approach to, and tactical engagements within the WTO should be based on 
the following clear understandings. 
(I) Despite the legalistic terminology of the agreements and the quasi-
judicial nature of the dispute settlement procedures, the WTO is not 
some detached and dispassionate supra-political legal institution with 
rules and regulations based on impartial and equitable, abstract and 
universal legal principles. It is a political construct and, from the process 
of its formation, in the content of its agreements and in the functioning 
of its secretariat, the WTO is fundamentally biased towards the most 
developed countries and against the 'developing' world. 
(2) The WTO was created as a political instrument for the consolidation of 
the liberalised global economy propelled by global corporate interests, 
as well as for the defence and promotion of continuing national eco-
nomic and strategic interests of the most industrialised countries. Its 
terms and modus operandii are the product of self-serving and highly 
tendentious political processes, based upon and a particular 
economic model or paradigm favouring the strong, and created on the 
basis of a particular balance of global power in a specific historical period. 
(3) As such, the WTO is a political arena characterised by unrelenting 
battles for national, sectoral or corporate advantage. as well as a neces-
sary forum for the negotiation and accommodation of converging or 
common interests. The international agreements and procedures that 
currently regulate, and continue to evolve from, such extremely ten-
dentious and contentious processes are complex combinations of com-
peting and conflicting interests. and are replete with compromises and 
trade-offs, inconsistencies and internal contradictions, inequalities and 
inequities. 
(4) In this light. the WTO's general rules and regulations and specific MTAs 
cannot be regarded as immutable fait accompli. They do not derive 
from unchanging and unchangeable abstract principles but from very 
specific interests and aims, and on this basis they cannot be accepted 
as being 'set in stone'. The WTO's terms must clearly be understood, 
and forcefully argued. to be amenable to alterations through ongOing 
negotiations, on the basis of deeper investigation and analysis of their 
implications, and wider or new evidence of their effects. 
(5) Such (re)considerations and (re)negotiations. and appropriate modifica-
tions, are feasible and achievable under different balances of power or 
changing circumstances. Recognition of this very basic point is not to 
suggest or however, that this is simple or straightforward. The 
process and outcome of such a mission and vision will reflect. and 
will depend upon, the creation of effective strategic alliances amongst 
developing countries with general or specific interests in common, or 
on the basis of tactical alliances and trade-offs where they differ. 
(6) As for South Africa itself. it would be a fundamental miscalculation for 
this country to believe that it can stand aside from such alliances of de-
veloping countries and operate as a solo player from some special position 
between, or even as a supposed 'bridge between,' the highly industrial-
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'influence' with the DCs would, in all likelihood, be minimal, and the 
dangers of co-optation by very skilful and powerful global players con-
siderable; whereas the denial to the rest of the developing world of 
South Africa's direct engagement and cooperation would be immediate 
and immense. 
(7) Similarly, if the South African political and legal authorities adopt the 
narrowly legalistiC approach that this country has the legal skills and insti-
tutional capacities to 'cope' with the challenges of the WTO, that would 
be potentially self-defeating, reflecting a superficial understanding of the 
nature, aims and implications of the WTO agreements. The question is 
not whether this country can 'comply' with the WTOs rules and regula-
tions and implement the MTAs, or not ... but whether these are appro-
priate for the development needs and interests of this country, and 
whether South Africa should 'comply' with or seek to change such rules. 
(8) South Africa has to come to terms with the fact that it is not a 'devel-
oped' country, a 'major trading nation' and an independent 'global 
player' of some weight and influence, as key trade strategists in this 
country declare. Whatever this country's legal categorisation in the 
WTO, whatever its chosen international diplomatic positions, and public 
relations projections to improve its international status and 'image', 
there is a limit to how far these can ignore or seek to cover up the reali-
ties and susceptibilities of this country's economy and SOCiety. The ba-
sic fact is that South Africa is a developing country with many serious 
problems and vulnerabilities and, in many spheres, with features char-
acteristic of other LLDCs. 
(9) And, in the final analysis, as the South African government recognises 
and repeatedly states, the current situation and the future development 
and security of this country are intricately and inextricably bound up 
with the LLDCs of the rest of Southern Africa, and indeed the rest of the 
African continent. This established understanding has to determine and 
drive South Africa's strategic engagement in the WTO as well. 
Sources 
Abugre C "The proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) and Africa's 
desire for Foreign Direct Investment", mimeo, paper presented at first 
meeting of the African Trade Network (ATN) February 1998 Accra Ghana. 
Brenner R "The Economics of Global Turbulence" in New Left Review #229 
May-June 1998 London. 
Clairmont F "The Rise and Fall of Economic Liberalism - The Making of the 
Economic Gulag" Third World Network 1996 Penang Malaysia. 
Das BL "An Introduction to the WTO Agreements" in 'Trade and Develop-
ment Issues and the WTO' series of the Third World Network (1998) 
Penang Malaysia. 
Das BL "The WTO Agreements Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required 
Changes" in 'Trade and Development Issues and the WTO' series of the 










































GLOBALISATION. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
Egypt "Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in the 
Multilateral Trading System" Communication from Egypt to the WTO 
General Council Committee on Trade and Development WT/GCll09 5 
November 1998 Geneva. 
European Commission (EC) "Objectives and Contents of the European 
Commission Initiative for Establishing International Rules for Foreign 
Investments" Europe Documents Bulletin Quotidien # I 926 22 March 1995 
Brussels. 
European Union "EU/WTO: EU Proposes IncreaSing Transparency, Profes-
sionalism and Effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement System of the World 
Trade Organisation" Bulletin Quotidien #7327 22 October 1998 Brussels. 
India "Developing Countries seek review of S&D implementation", report on 
presentation by India to the WTO General Council preparatory process for 
the 3rd Ministerial meeting, reported in Third World Economics # 1 97 
16-30 November 1998 Penang Malaysia. 
Keet D "Integrating the World Community - Political Challenges and 
Opportunities for Developing Countries" in Southern African Perspectives 
#70 Center for Southern African Studies School of Government University 
of the Western Cape (1997). 
Keet D "Anticipating and Influencing the WTO Review of Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs)", paper presented at the 'Southern and Eastern African 
Trade Information and Negotiations Initiative (SEATINl) workshop for 
African Trade Officials and Negotiators towards the Second WTO Ministe-
rial Meeting and Future Negotiations' mimeo 29 March-4 April 1998 
Harare Zimbabwe. 
Keet D "Regional Integration and Development in Southern Africa - the 
Implications of a Reciprocal Free Trade Agreement withn the EU" in 
'Farewell to Lome? The Impact of Neo-Liberal EU Policies on the ACP 
Countries Vemo Campaign German EU Presidency Koordination Sudliches 
Afrika Bonn 1999. 
Khor M "The WTO and the Proposed Miltilateral Investment Agreement: 
Implications for Developing Countries and proposed Positions" TWN trade 
and Development Series #2 Penang Malayisa 1996. 
Khor M "Competing Views on 'Competition Policy' in the WTO", mimeo 
paper presented at the Southern and East African Trade Information and 
Negotiating Initiative Harare April 1997. 
Khor M "New non-trade issues in the WTO - a comment" in Third World 
Resurgence # 1 08 1999. 
Onimode B "A future for Africa beyond the politics of adjustment" 
Earthscan in association with the Institute for African Alternatives London 
1992. 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) "Declaration of the African Countries on 
the High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
OXFAM "For Richer, and for Poorer? Development Challenges for the WTO", 
briefing paper prepared for the WTO Ministerial and 50th Anniversary 
Celebrations in Geneva May 1998 Oxford. 
Ragavan C "Reconolonization - GATT. the Uruguay Round and the Third 
World" Third World Network Penang Malaysia 1990. 
Shahin M "From Marrakesh to Singapore: The WTO and Developing 
Countries" Third World Network Penang Malaysia 1996. 
Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Initiative 
(SEATINI) workshop in conjunction with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) For African Trade Officials and Negotiators towards the 
Second WTO Ministerial Meeting and Future Negotiations 29 March-4 April 
1998 Harare Zimbabwe. 
Third World Resurgence "NGOs reject any proposal for moving the MAl or an 
investment agreement to the WTO", reproduced in Third World Resurgence 
#95 July 1 998 Penang Malayisa. 
UNCTAD "Developing a positive trade negotiating agenda: issues of interest 
to Africa" discussion paper prepared by UNCTAD secretariat ibid 1998b. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) "Special 
and Differential Treatment: Search for a New Strategy", Discussion Paper 
prepared by UNCT AD Secretariat for the Regional Programme for Capacity 
Building in Trade and Development for Africa Geneva 1998. 
World Bank "Intra-regional Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa" World Bank 
Economic and Finance Divisions Africa Region May 199 I Washington. 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) "Report to the First WTO Ministerial 
Conference" 9-13 December 1996 Singapore 
54 
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 S
ab
in
et
 G
at
ew
ay
 u
nd
er
 li
ce
nc
e 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
Pu
bl
is
he
r (
da
te
d 
20
09
).
